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“A RANK USURPATION OF POWER”1–THE ROLE OF PATRIARCHAL
RELIGION AND CULTURE IN THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN
GILA STOPLER*

I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental assumption of contemporary feminist theory and practice is
2
that gender is a form of power, and a universal one at that. The system
facilitating and entrenching this power—patriarchy—can be defined as the
manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women in
3
society. Anthropologist Sherry Ortner argues that in every known culture
4
women are considered in some degree inferior to men. She identifies three
types of data that constitute evidence that a particular culture considers women
inferior: “(1) elements of cultural ideology and informants’ statements that
explicitly devalue women, according them, their roles, their tasks, their
products, and their social milieux less prestige than are accorded men and the
male correlates; (2) symbolic devices, such as the attribution of defilement,
which may be interpreted as implicitly making a statement of inferior valuation;
and (3) social-structural arrangements that exclude women from participation in
or contact with some realm in which the highest powers of the society are felt to
5
reside.” Although any of these data types will suffice to indicate women’s
inferiority in a given culture, they might all occur simultaneously and appear
6
interrelated. This is true in some dominant versions of major religions, such as
conservative Christianity and orthodox Judaism, in which women are devalued,
considered impure, and barred from positions of power.

1. Angelina Grimke, Angelina E. Grimke, Letters to Catherine [sic] E. Beecher, in reply to An Essay
on Slavery and Abolitionism, addressed to A. E. Grimke, in THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARA AND ANGELINA
GRIMKE SELECTED WRITINGS 1835–39 146, 197 (Larry Ceplair ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE PUBLIC
YEARS].
* Assistant Professor, Academic Center of Law & Business, Ramat Gan Israel, JSD, LLM NYU
School of Law; LLB Tel Aviv University.
2. Nicholas Dirks et. al., Introduction to CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 3, 33 (Nicholas Dirks et. al. eds., 1994); ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA
LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL- COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE
33 (1993).
3. This definition is adapted from Gerda Lerner, who defines patriarchy as “the manifestation
and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the
extension of male dominance over women in society in general.” GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF
PATRIARCHY 239 (1986) [hereinafter THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY].
4. SHERRY B. ORTNER, MAKING GENDER: THE POLITICS AND EROTICS OF CULTURE 23 (1996).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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This article discusses the way in which the power of religion and culture
perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy. Although religion and culture are as
fundamental to women as they are to men and are shared by both women and
men, the current legal protection afforded to patriarchal aspects of religion and
culture perpetuates patriarchy’s hegemony and seriously undermines women’s
ability to achieve equality. Although freedoms of religion and association and
the right to culture are equally important to women and men, how these rights
are understood and applied perpetuates gender hierarchy and deprives women
of equality and freedom rather than ensuring their freedom of religion and
culture or guaranteeing them equal respect. Furthermore, liberalism’s skewed
understanding of the desired scope and content of toleration, religious liberty,
and cultural and associational rights stems from its lack of an adequate theory of
7
power. Liberalism disregards the institutions, practices, discourses, and norms
of a religion or culture as a socially and politically significant site of power,
which severely curtails its ability to ensure that the exercise of power and
authority over the individual is justified and that the rights of the individual are
8
safeguarded.
Part II will present the concepts of power, culture (and religion), and
hegemony and will expose the ways in which the power of religion and culture
creates and perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy. Part III will utilize a
historical perspective to describe the advent and perpetuation of patriarchy and
the historical relationship between patriarchy and patriarchal religion. Part III.A
will provide an overview of the creation of patriarchy primarily through
patriarchal religion. Part III.B will describe its perpetuation through the control
of knowledge and paternalistic dominance. Part III.C will analyze the insightful
critiques of church and state offered by early American feminists, such as the
Grimke sisters and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Historically, feminists, especially
religious feminists, have recognized the central role of religion in women’s
oppression and have demanded equality for women inside as well as outside
religion. Modern feminism has largely neglected the call for equality within
religion, assuming, following the enlightenment and its underlying
assumptions, that it is both possible and desirable to guarantee equality for
women in society at large without directly confronting religious prejudice and
that religion and its accompanying prejudice are a passing phenomenon. This
change within feminism can be explained both by the apparent loss of power
that patriarchal religion has suffered after the severance of its long-standing,
official ties with the state and by the inability of liberal feminism to properly
analyze and critique the power patriarchal religion has retained despite severing
its ties with the state. Nevertheless, recent struggles between feminism and
conservative religion over the ERA and abortion demonstrate the power of
patriarchal religion is very much alive, and its ability to safeguard the
hegemony of patriarchy and circumvent women’s struggle for equality is
considerable.

7. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 193. See also NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER,
DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 26 (1989).
8. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 76.
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Part IV will claim that despite the constitutional separation between church
and state, patriarchal religion continues to influence—directly and indirectly—
the law and to constitute a significant force perpetuating the hegemony of
patriarchy. Part IV.A will describe how religious doctrines prescribing the
subordination of women have entered American law and remain there under
different guises to this very day. Part IV.B will argue that religious freedom,
freedom of association, and the right to culture are being used as “status
9
enforcing mechanisms” to maintain women’s subordination. Part IV.C will
utilize the abortion controversy to demonstrate how patriarchal religion affects
current law, and part IV.D will challenge the notion that toleration requires
acceptance and protection for patriarchal religious practices. Finally, part IV.E
will argue that a proper analysis of the power of religion and culture and the
way in which it is used to maintain the hegemony of patriarchy would result in
a very different understanding of the desired scope and content of toleration,
religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights than current liberal
understanding. Specifically, toleration should be required and religious liberty
and cultural and associational rights should be vigorously protected. But such
protection should not entrench unequal power relations and the hegemony of
patriarchy. When the freedom of a patriarchal religion to continue practices that
subordinate women conflicts with the right of women to receive equal treatment
both inside and outside religion, the right of women should prevail.
II. POWER/CULTURE/HEGEMONY: HOW THE POWER OF RELIGION AND CULTURE
CREATES AND PERPETUATES THE HEGEMONY OF PATRIARCHY
A. Power
The most influential theorist of power, Michel Foucault, is said to have
revolutionized the western perception of power. Foucault posited that a major
problem with western perceptions of power is both the representation of power
10
in a juridical form and its attribution to the sovereign. “The language of power
11
is law, not magic, religion or anything else.” It is focused on the rights of the
individual vis-à-vis the sovereign and neglects all other forms of power that
12
threaten individual rights. According to Foucault, a proper analysis of power
must extend beyond the limits of the state both “because the state, for all the
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field
of actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the
13
basis of other, already existing power relations.” Thus, Foucault posited that

9. The term “status enforcing mechanism” is borrowed from Reva B. Seigel, Discrimination in
the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 99 (Robert C. Post et.
al. eds., 2001).
10. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972–1977 109, 119–21 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et. al. trans., 1980).
11. Id. at 201.
12. Id. at 121–22.
13. Id. at 122.
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power is everywhere; it is exercised from “within the social body rather than
14
from above it,” and it is deeply, albeit covertly, invasive. Power is a productive
social network defined by “a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated
15
cluster of relations.” Furthermore, power cannot be recognized simply by its
appearance as a negative force. Power is accepted because it is a hierarchical,
productive force that “induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces
16
discourse.” As Phelan explains, “[p]ower operates through discourses that
17
define and legitimate its operation.” This understanding of power is highly
compatible with the view that culture and its religious subsets are a major site of
power. Importantly, Foucault posited that power relies on the appearance of
18
freedom. It covertly guides conduct and suggests possible outcomes because
the person upon whom it is exercised is envisioned as a person whose actions
19
are freely chosen. In this respect, religion and culture are quintessential sites of
power because they are highly determinative of individual actions and are
regarded as positively informing rather than obstructing free choice.
Arguably, the inadequacy of the liberal theory of power stems from its
individualistic structure and inability to consider the group as a crucial mediator
20
between the individual and the state. An analysis that recognizes groups both
as a crucial site of power and a crucial reservoir of power that can be utilized by
members both within and outside the group entails a different understanding of
existing power relations and their effects on individuals. The focus on the state
as the major, or even sole, threat to individual rights is particularly evident in
theories of political liberalism, wherein the commitment to maintaining freedom
from the state in the private sphere of community far exceeds the commitment
21
to protect the individual from private oppression. But if power is everywhere,
then the liberal framework envisioning the private sphere as a power-free zone
22
of rights is mistaken. Moreover, as Fraser points out, employing Foucault’s
analysis, “the proliferation of discourse governed by this liberal framework may
itself function . . . to mask the actual character of power and thus to conceal
23
domination.” Consequently, Fraser argues that Foucault can be understood to
advocate a “politics of everyday life” because “if power is instantiated in

14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Prison Talk, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 37, 39.
15. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Confession of the Flesh, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 194,
198.
16. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 109, 119.
17. Shane Phelan, Foucault and Feminism, 34 AMERICAN J. OF POL. SCI. 421, 424 (1990).
18. Id. at 425.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 197.
21. The prime example is Rawls’ theory of political liberalism which “rather than confronting
religious and nonliberal doctrines with a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine . . . (aims) to
formulate a liberal political conception that those nonliberal doctrines might be able to endorse.”
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, xlvii (1996).
22. FRASER, supra note 7, at 26.
23. Id. at 26–27.
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mundane social practices and relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform
24
the regime must address those practices and relations.”
B. Culture
Foucault’s theory of power is particularly conducive to a proper analysis of
the power that culture, and religion as an important part of culture, has in
25
people’s lives. Although in the past “one of the core dimensions of the concept
of culture has been the notion that culture is ‘shared’ by all members of a given
society,” it has now become clear to contemporary anthropologists that when
“we speak of culture as shared, we must always ask ‘by whom?’ and ‘in what
26
ways?’ and ‘under what conditions?’”
Furthermore, contemporary
anthropology emphasizes “the degree to which culture is grounded in unequal
relations and is differentially related to people and groups in different social
27
positions.” Surveying developments in the theory of anthropology since the
sixties, Ortner argues that while in the past anthropological research has
emphasised what culture enables people to see, feel, and do, it has since moved
to emphasize the ways in which culture restricts people’s actions and feelings.
Precisely because anthropologists agree that culture effectively shapes the
reality that people live in, they consider this reality with critical eyes and
question why that particular reality has been created and what sorts of
28
alternative realities people are prevented from experiencing. Ortner further
argues that although material and political constraints such as force are fully
acknowledged, there is considerable agreement among anthropologists that
culture and religion systematically constrain action by controlling people’s
“definitions of the world,” limiting “their conceptual tools,” and restricting
29
“their emotional repertoires.” Thus, religion and culture restrict most deeply
30
by becoming part of the self.
C. Hegemony

24. Id. at 26.
25. Kymlicka defines societal culture as “a culture which provides its members with meaningful
ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.” WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 76 (David Miller & Alan Ryan
eds., 1995). Religion is an essential part of culture and the more religious the community the greater
religion’s part in defining the culture of that community. On religion as a cultural system, see Gidon
Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 631–32 (1999). For
this reason, religion and religious culture had a crucial role in creating the hegemony of patriarchy
that was far greater than the role of secular culture. Consequently, my use of the term “culture”
should be understood as referring not only to secular culture but also, and even mainly, to religion
and religious culture. Similarly, I often use the terms religion and culture together in order to
emphasize the role of religion and not to suggest that religion is not a part of culture.
26. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 3.
27. Id.
28. Sherry Ortner, Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 372, 396.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Id.
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The strength and depth of the power of culture and the central roles of
domination and subordination in forming culture are perhaps best captured in
31
Hegemony is “the power to
Antonio Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony.”
establish the ‘common sense’ or ‘doxa’ of a society, the fund of self-evident
32
descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying.” If culture is
traditionally understood as the social process by which people define and shape
their lives, then hegemony goes beyond this traditional understanding by
33
relating culture to specific distributions of power and influence.
Thus,
hegemony’s most important contribution is recognizing that culture is both
political and ideological because it is produced to serve certain dominant
34
interests. But, the concept of hegemony also expands beyond “ideology” in
insisting that our perception of the world is not only shaped merely by a
conscious system of ideas and beliefs but also by our whole lived experience
35
that is itself shaped by specific and dominant meanings and values.
Hegemony is not solely an ideology and it does not operate just through
manipulation or indoctrination:
It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our
senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of our selves and
our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and
constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally
confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in society, a
sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult
36
for most members of society to move, in most areas of their lives.

Consequently, it is not only the hegemonic culture that becomes part of the
self, but also the relationship of dominance and subordination upon which the
37
culture is founded that becomes an inseparable part of the self.
Thus,
hegemony’s most important contribution is stressing that hegemonic culture
“constitutes the terrains of meaning and feeling that are central to the securing
of consent and/or the incitement to rebellion,” which renders the use of force
38
and coercion to secure cooperation largely unnecessary.
This article will argue against legal protections for religion and culture to
the extent that they serve to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy. Legal
concepts such as toleration, religious liberty, and associational and cultural
rights are used, inter alia, to perpetuate the subordination of women, and the
only way to end the hegemony of patriarchy and replace it with a hegemony of
equality is to intervene in religion and culture. According to Williams,

31. Raymond Williams, Selections from Marxism and Literature, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 585, 595.
32. Nancy Fraser, The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics, 17
BOUNDARY II 82, 85 (1990).
33. Williams, supra note 31, at 595.
34. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23.
35. Williams, supra note 31, at 595.
36. Id. at 596–97.
37. Id.
38. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23.
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“hegemony is always a process.” “It does not just passively exist as a form of
dominance,” but “has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and
40
modified.” Simultaneously, it is also “continually resisted, limited, altered,
41
[and] challenged by pressures not at all its own.”
Thus, hegemony
presupposes a process in which cultural authority is continuously negotiated
42
and contested, but wherein some perspectives have more authority than others.
Understanding hegemony as a structure of pervasive domination, which is
continuously challenged and defended, is important for feminism because it
highlights both the depth and strength of patriarchal religion and culture’s
influence over all of our lives and the role of individual agency in defending and
challenging this structure. An important feminist critique of structuralist
theories such as Foucault’s is that they fail to envision power as both a structural
43
and an individual concept. Therefore, power lies both in the social structures
and in the individuals who exercise it. All exercise of power is completed
within social and cultural structures comprised of discourses and practices that
make the exercise possible and significant. Nevertheless, within this sociocultural context the exercise of power is by individuals, who are not merely
affected by power, but are also actively participating in practices and discourses
44
that create power by exercising it, resisting it or failing to resist it. Although it
largely determines the positions, practices and discourses of individuals, the
hegemonic structure is also simultaneously being created and recreated,
challenged, and defended through the actions, practices, and discourses of
individual actors.
A similar understanding of the socio-cultural process is embraced by
practice theory anthropologists. In practice theory, human action in seen as both
“constrained by the given social and cultural order” and as making “structure”“
45
by reproducing it, transforming it, or both. Consequently, the refusal of some
religions to ordain women should be seen both in the context of an established,
sexist power structure and as an individual exercise of power by religious
leaders who may have the power to transform the unequal social structure, but
choose not to act. Similarly, state refusal to utilize the law to intervene on behalf
of women who are refused ordination or discriminated against in religious
positions should also be seen as both a manifestation of the established sexist
power structure within the state and an individual exercise of power by state
officials—such as judges or legislatures—who choose to utilize their power to
protect the system rather than transform it. Finally, the religious women who
challenge the discrimination within their own faith, who support it, or who
merely refuse to challenge it should be understood as individual actors acting

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Williams, supra note 31, at 598.
Id.
Id.
Fraser, supra note 32, at 85.
FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 35.
Id.
ORTNER, supra note 4, at 2.
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within their (highly constrained) positions in the patriarchal structure with the
goal of either transforming or reproducing the structure itself.
By using the force of law to bar both internal and external challenges to
patriarchal religion and culture, liberal states are reneging on their expressed
commitment to transforming the system to achieve women’s equality and are
subsequently entrenching patriarchal hegemony. In the legal systems of liberal
states, the hegemony of patriarchy is partially challenged by equality legislation
that is aimed at ensuring equality before the law, equality in the public sphere,
and equality in specific areas such as employment. However, such challenges
are inadequate because the nucleus of the hegemonic power of patriarchy lies
within religion and culture. If hegemony is secured not through public social
institutions, but primarily through control over religious and cultural language
and imagery, through the shaping of everyday practices, and through
constituting meaning and feeling, then the hegemony of patriarchy can never
truly be challenged without an outright challenge to the patriarchal practices
entrenched in most religions and cultures.
III. PATRIARCHY AND PATRIARCHAL RELIGION–A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Creation of Patriarchy
Early American feminist Angelina Grimke has identified the “mere
46
circumstance of sex” as the founding force of patriarchy. A historical study by
Gerda Lerner reveals that prior to the formation of the archaic states, societies
existed in which men and women were substantially equal, even though a
division of labor existed that was based on the woman’s exclusive ability to give
birth and ensure the survival of the infant given the conditions in prehistoric
47
times.
Far from serving as a justification for male domination, woman’s
procreative power was venerated, and the first form of religious worship was
48
the worship of the Mother–Goddess.
Archeological and historical evidence indicates that for thousands of years
49
and across cultures the Mother–Goddess was worshiped as the Supreme Being.
The power of the goddesses remained active and strong even as women’s
50
economic, educational, and legal subordination deepened. Lerner posits that
the development of strong kingships and archaic states brought changes in
religious beliefs and symbols. The Mother–Goddess figure was demoted and
gradually replaced with a male Creator–God as the head of the pantheon of
51
gods and goddesses to whom the power of creation and fertility was
transferred. These changes in religious symbols and meanings closely reflect the

46.
47.
48.
49.

Angelina Grimke, supra note 1, at 194.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 40–41.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 141–60. See also ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEOLOGY 47 (1993) [hereinafter SEXISM AND GOD-TALK].
50. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 141–42.
51. Id. at 145.
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gradual absorption of female rights by the patriarchal structure and the
transition from matrilineal kinship and royal succession to patrilineal kinship
52
and succession. Initially, the goddesses had power in their own right, and their
power was not limited only to sex and procreation but extended to all domains,
53
including power on the battlefield and over other gods and kings.
The
goddesses and gods were equivalent images of the divine, which had both
54
sexual potency and social power. As a gradual reflection of the societal change
in the concepts of gender, the power of the goddesses was transformed into the
power to intercede with the dominant male god and was restricted to domains
55
such as healing and procreation. Nevertheless, the worship of the goddesses
continued to flourish in popular religion while the priests and the ruling elites
were transforming official religious practices and texts that created the new
56
dominance of the male god. In fact, archeological evidence shows that the
goddess Asherah was worshipped alongside the Hebrew god in the Hebrew
57
temple for two thirds of its existence.
For many people, the Hebrew god
58
replaced the Canaanite god Baal as the husband of the goddess.
Lerner maintains that all religions have to answer three basic questions: (1)
Who can speak to God? (2) Who creates life? (3) Who brings evil into the world?
In a brilliant analysis, Lerner demonstrates how through a gradual process that
culminated with the Hebrew monotheist religion and the Bible, the answers to
these questions were transformed so as to entrench patriarchal rule and
women’s subordination and make them appear natural and inevitable.
1. Who Can Speak to God?
As long as the worship of goddesses continued, women could find their
likeness in the image of the female goddesses just as men could find their
59
likeness in the image of the male gods.
Women were empowered both
symbolically and practically through the goddesses and their priestesses (the
60
goddesses usually had female priestesses while male gods had male priests).
Thus, women could both speak directly to God and find themselves in God
without the need for male mediation. With the advent of monotheist religion
and the worship of a single, supreme, male God, women’s access to God was
severely curtailed, and they were rendered powerless in their religious life.
Although in the early texts the Hebrew god was not gendered and could
theoretically embody both male and female aspects, he has always been
61
perceived as a male Father–God. The result has been the emergence of an all

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 154–58.
Id. at 143.
SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 52.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 159.
Id. at 158.
SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 56.
Id.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 160.
Id. at 142, 178.
Id. at 178.
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male priesthood. Women had no place in the religious ritual, neither functional
62
nor administrative or even as a member of the cult fellowship. Though at first
women and men congregated together for worship, by the time of the second
temple women were no longer allowed to enter the area of the temple reserved
for those who took part in the religious ritual. Segregation between men and
63
women was created, and women could no longer speak to God.
The basis for excluding women from speaking to God is the biblical story of
the covenant between God and the Hebrews, in which God promises the chosen
people collective immortality in the form of many generations of children, land,
power, and victory over their enemies if they fulfill certain obligations under the
64
covenant. In the biblical story, the covenant God makes with Abraham, which
is later confirmed in his covenant with Moses, is a covenant between God and
65
man alone wherein woman has no place.
God makes the covenant with
Abraham alone and not with Sarah. It is only Abraham who God addresses,
and it is only he who God advises of his and his progeny’s rights and duties
under the covenant. Thus, the leadership of the patriarch over his family and
66
tribe is given divine sanction. Sarah’s relation to the covenant as the bearer of
Abraham’s children embodies the relation of women to both religion and the
67
state for generations to come.
Consequently, Sarah is the means through
whom God’s covenant with Abraham and His promise to multiply Abraham’s
seed is to be carried out. But, her relation to the covenant itself and therefore to
God exists only through her relationship to Abraham and her role as the childbearer. Following God’s covenant with men, women can no longer connect
68
directly to God but must connect to Him indirectly through men.
2. Who Creates Life?
The symbol chosen as the token of the covenant, circumcision, is a
69
powerful representation of the exclusion of women. Women are irreversibly
excluded from the covenant both because they do not have penises and because
similar to the focus on Abraham’s seed, the focus on the male penis signifies the
shift from the female to the male procreative role. This shift fosters the belief
that man creates life and therefore has a right over both his wife and his
70
progeny.
The transformation from the worship of woman’s sexual and
reproductive role, represented by the worship of goddesses, to man’s
metaphysical appropriation of these roles, is powerfully illustrated in the story
of creation in the Book of Genesis. The biblical story of Adam and Eve is one of
the most powerful myths of western civilization and has defined the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 177–78.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 178–79.
Id at 193; Genesis 17 (King James).
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 189–90.
Id. at 190.
Id.
SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 53.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 190–92.
Id.

05_STOPLER.DOC

11/24/2008 9:56:09 AM

USURPATION OF POWER

375

relationships between men and women on both theoretical and practical levels
71
for generations. After creating Adam, the man, from the dust of the earth, God
put Adam to sleep and from his rib he created his mate, who Adam then named
72
Woman. In this story not only does a male God create humanity, but also
reverses the biological and natural order of things in making woman evolve
73
from man’s body and not man from woman’s body. Thus, man’s right to
ownership over woman stems both from Adam’s power in naming Eve just as
74
he names the animals and from the physical fact that Eve is created out of
75
Adam’s rib so Adam is seen as “giving birth” to Eve. Consequently, as Lerner
observes, the prevailing assumption throughout Genesis is that humans are
born to men and that the physical act of procreation is a male act in which no
76
mothers are involved. Adam’s “giving birth” to Eve is an act devoid of any
sexual nature, pain, or blood and involves only Adam and God. The only other
birth in the history of the Judeo–Christian tradition in which no sexual
intercourse is involved is Mary’s immaculate conception of Jesus. The event
also represents the lost alternative before the Fall, when “pure nature, as it came
forth from the hand of God, was totally under the power of the Spirit, and so
77
was without evil and was not subject to death.” Mary’s ability to give birth
without sexual intercourse, an unprecedented phenomenon after the Fall, raises
her to a level above all other women. As part of their punishment for the Fall,
women are obliged to engage in sexual intercourse in order to procreate and are
destined to give birth in pain and suffering.
3. Who Brings Evil into the World?
After the woman ate from the tree of knowledge and seduced Adam into
eating as well, they were both banished from paradise and Adam renamed the
78
woman Eve, for “she was to be the mother of all living.” The creation of Eve
79
from Adam’s rib has been seen as proof of the God-given inferiority of woman.
An additional justification for women’s inferiority in the Christian tradition is
found in Eve’s responsibility for the fall of Adam, which was interpreted to hold
80
all women responsible for the advent of evil into the world. At the time of the
writing of Genesis, “the snake was clearly associated with the fertility goddess
81
and symbolically represented her.” Thus, it is the woman’s inducement by the

71. MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION 44–
45 (1985); ORIT KAMIR, EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES AND THE LAW 30 (2001); THE
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 182.
72. Genesis 2:21–23 (King James).
73. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 181.
74. Id.
75. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, NEW WOMAN NEW EARTH, SEXIST IDEOLOGIES AND HUMAN
LIBERATION 15 (Beacon Press 1995) (1975).
76. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 187.
77. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 151.
78. Genesis 3:20 (King James).
79. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 183.
80. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 167–68.
81. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 196.
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snake, which represents the fertility goddess and in turn a woman’s own free
82
sexuality, that is responsible for the Fall. Woman’s punishment for her act is
comprised of her eternal subjugation to her husband, the restriction of her
sexuality solely for purposes of procreation within the conjugal relationship,
83
and the pain of child bearing.
In Christian thought, woman’s role as a
submissive wife and mother is not only her punishment but also her only means
84
of salvation.
In the service of patriarchy, the story of Creation establishes the following
facts: (1) God granted procreative power to man and not to woman; (2) sexual
intercourse, pregnancy, and childbirth are not an expression of women’s unique
power to procreate (which God placed with man), but the physical
manifestations of women’s punishment for the Fall; (3) man’s closer relationship
with God along with his procreative power entitle him to ownership of both
women and their offspring, which are exclusively man’s offspring.
Furthermore, if woman’s punishment for the Fall is both to be the vessel of
man’s procreative power and to suffer pain and sorrow while performing this
role, then one could argue that treating women as a means for procreation
becomes not only permissible but necessary and commendable.
More
importantly, a woman who tries to obstruct in any way—such as through
contraceptives or abortion—the fulfillment of her procreative obligations,
should be condemned for trying to avoid the deserved punishment God has
ordained for her and for attempting to prevent man from fulfilling his own
procreative obligation to God. If it is woman (Eve) who through her
disobedience is to blame for her destiny to give birth and suffer for it, what right
does she have to object to this destiny or try to manipulate it? After all, had it
not been for woman’s disobedience, procreation might have been achieved
painlessly and magically through man’s body (e.g., the creation of Eve) without
85
any soiling female involvement.
Viewed this way, the story of creation provides an airtight justification for
man’s superiority over woman, for his right to control her sexuality and
procreative ability (and therefore her body), and for his right to possess both her
and her offspring. The only thing left to ascertain is that woman has no power
to challenge this story because man exerts a monopoly over knowledge.
Ironically, Eve was the first to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and the first to
acquire the ability to distinguish good from evil. Consequently, she was
banished from the Garden of Eden along with Adam. Nevertheless, it is the
denial of women’s moral capacity and their ability to distinguish right from

82. Id. at 198.
83. Id. at 196; Genesis 3:16 (King James).
84. “But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence.
For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived but the woman being deceived
was in the transgression. Notwithstanding she shall be saved in childbearing, if they continue in
faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.” 1 Timothy 2:12–15 (King James).
85. See Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
43 (2005) [hereinafter Gender Construction] (Discussing the use of the myth of Adam and Eve and the
suppression and demonization of Eve’s counter image–Lilith–as a framework for the construction of
gender in the western world and on the implications of this use for liberal equality).
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wrong that maintains the hegemony of patriarchy and justifies women’s
subordination. This denial of women’s moral capacity is at the heart of the
critique of patriarchy and of patriarchal religion by abolitionist feminists such as
86
the Grimke sisters.
The symbolic devaluing of women in relation to the divine is achieved in
the Hebrew monotheist religion through the establishment of a supreme, male
God who makes a covenant exclusively with men that excludes women from the
religious ritual and from the religious symbol systems. Through the portrayal of
woman, especially her sexuality, as the source of all weakness and evil, this
symbolic devaluation becomes one of the two founding metaphors of western
87
civilization.
Aristotelian philosophy supplies the other founding metaphor
and holds “that women are incomplete and damaged human beings of an
88
entirely different order than men.” Whereas male is active female is passive;
89
whereas male is soul female is matter. Whereas the male is a complete human
being comprised of both matter and soul, the female is a mutilated male who
90
lacks soul and is only matter. This incompleteness of the woman makes her
inferior in her capacities, in her ability to reason, and in her ability to make
decisions, making man’s rule over woman just as natural and expedient as
91
man’s rule over the animals. Thus, we see that the hegemony of patriarchy,
which is crucially dependent on the divine sanction granted to it by patriarchal
religion, is further expanded and entrenched through patriarchal philosophy.
These concepts coalesce and are deeply rooted in Christian thought wherein
male superiority is the embodiment of the transcendent mind, and the female
embodies an inferior physical nature, body, and passions and represents the
92
source of sin.
On the basis of these two founding metaphors of western
civilization, the subordination of women is seen as natural, and the stereotypes
regarding women appear to represent reality, resulting in the firm establishment
93
of patriarchy as an actuality and as an ideology. Therefore, the hegemony of
patriarchy is established.
B. The Control of Knowledge and Paternalistic Dominance as Key Elements of
the Hegemony of Patriarchy and Patriarchal Religion
1. Control of Knowledge
One of Foucault’s most important insights is that power operates by
forming knowledge and producing discourses that define and legitimate its
94
operation. Men’s monopoly over defining, determining, and interpreting truth

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See the discussion of the Grimke sisters and other abolitionist feminists infra.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 199–201.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 206–07.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 93.
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 211.
Phelan, supra note 17, at 424.
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and knowledge perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy and maintains men’s
control over women. Nowhere is the structure of patriarchy more evident than
in patriarchal religions, which are built on two pillars of control—men’s control
over truth and knowledge, which ensures their control over women, and men’s
control over women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity. The considerable
influence of patriarchal religions in liberal democratic societies also manifests
itself along these same two pillars of control. In the United States this is
demonstrated very well in the abortion controversy. The “knowledge” that life
begins at conception not only serves to prevent women within some patriarchal
religions from having abortions, but when allegedly severed from its religious
origins and presented as socio-cultural “knowledge,” this “knowledge” also
95
serves to justify legal restrictions on abortions imposed by the secular state.
The control of women’s reproductive ability and the division of labor attached
to it has been crucial in maintaining men’s control of knowledge. Throughout
history men have left themselves free to control culture by relegating most tasks
96
of domestic production and reproduction to women.
Based on their
procreative abilities, women have been assigned to perform all of the domestic
work, leaving men free to engage in cultural and religious definitions that justify
and normalize this division of labor. Accordingly, women’s procreativity and
sexuality have served as the basis for creating the hegemony of patriarchy by
excluding women from the creation of religion and culture and by turning them
from persons into property.
These exclusions enable the proprietor
(father/husband) to exploit their labor, fail to remunerate it, and declare it non
existent and insignificant while still relying on it as the indispensable basis for
97
his own achievements.
Patriarchal religions are not alone in using male domination of knowledge
and truth to control women’s sexuality and reproductive rights. As Betty
Friedan shows in her classic book The Feminine Mystique, scientific,
psychological, and cultural male-generated “truths” have served, as late as the
second half of the twentieth century, to reduce women to the role of complacent,
98
procreative machines. The hegemony of patriarchy is subsequently maintained
through mutually reaffirming religious, cultural, and scientific knowledge and
discourses. Although the control over knowledge and truth formation in most
disciplines and institutions in many liberal states is still largely in the hands of
men, most liberal states are at least formally committed to rectifying the
situation and achieving equality within these institutions. But, the opposite is
true with regard to religion, whereby liberal states are committed to protecting
the right of religious patriarchs to preserve their own hegemony by invoking
concepts such as freedom of religion and freedom of association, autonomy, and
toleration.

95.
96.
97.
98.

See, e.g., Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), discussed infra.
SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 74.
Id. at 261–63.
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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2. The Priesthood and the Control of Knowledge
Carol Gilligan defines patriarchy as a “hierarchy—a rule of priests—in
which the priest, the hieros, is a father. It describes an order of living that
elevates fathers, separates fathers from sons (the men from the boys), and places
99
both children and women under a father’s authority.” However, the sons will
grow up to become fathers, but the women will never do so. The order of
religious patriarchy is also established in the Garden of Eden story; God over
Adam, Adam over Eve, and the serpent at the bottom. Eve and then Adam eat
from the Tree of Knowledge and are punished by God through the
100
establishment of patriarchy. Patriarchy, according to Gilligan, is “secured by
the prohibition against knowing what you know through experience, a
101
prohibition that creates the need for the priesthood.”
In patriarchy “the
fathers stand at the top of the hierarchy, serving as priests—the interpreters of
truth, the dispensers of goodness, those with direct access to power, mediating
102
relationships with power for those below.”
Likewise, Radford Ruether suggests that the patriarchal domination of men
over women and fathers over children is duplicated in the ecclesiastical
103
hierarchy in the form of clericalism. The basic assumption of clericalism is that
the people have no direct access to the divine and the priests are the only ones
104
capable of preaching, teaching, and mediating between God and the laity.
While the “male laity may be allowed subordinate roles within this system of
clerical power,” women are excluded from such roles altogether and “become
the archetypal representatives of the passive recipients of clerical sacral
105
power.”
Consequently, Radford Ruether argues that “it is impossible to
liberate the Church from patriarchy and retain a clerical definition of the
106
ministry.” A similar claim was made more than a century and a half ago by
the Grimke sisters, two of the first American abolitionist feminists, who posited
that the church government would have to come down in order for women and
107
slaves to gain their rights.
Both aspects of patriarchy that are identified by Gilligan, sex and age, pose
an almost insurmountable obstacle for women in their attempt to challenge
patriarchal religions from within and to regain their right to interpret truth and
determine knowledge. While the sex factor keeps women subordinate to men,
the age factor keeps the system in place by immunizing ancient rules from
modern challenges. The reverence for the old and its superiority over the new is

99. CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE 16 (2003).
100. Id. at 205.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 156.
103. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 207.
104. Id. at 206–07.
105. Id. at 207.
106. Id.
107. Angelina Grimke, Angelina E. Grimke to Theodore Dwight Weld and John Greenleaf Whittier, in
THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARA AND ANGELINA GRIMKE SELECTED WRITINGS 1835–1839 281, 284 (Larry
Ceplair ed., 1989).
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108

For example, in Orthodox Judaism the
the hallmark of patriarchal religion.
authority of a biblical interpretation is determined first and foremost by its
antiquity, with older interpretations invariably superior to newer ones. This is a
fatal blow for those who attempt to change discriminatory interpretations of
biblical rules in favor of more egalitarian understandings. Truth and knowledge
become a more or less fixed essence, determined and controlled by men, the
priests–fathers, who are its sole judges and interpreters. Women who attempt to
change these discriminatory interpretations are silenced and excluded from the
community of believers with the assistance of the State, which prefers the right
of community leaders to determine who belongs to the community to the right
109
of the women to challenge their discrimination. Reducing women to silence is
an important tool in women’s subordination. Men define the world for both
men and women from the men’s point of view and dismiss interpretations that
110
come from the women’s point of view. When done in the name of religion and
culture, the liberal state not only condones this action but also considers it a
fundamental right. The control over knowledge is preserved, the hegemony of
patriarchy is protected and, the liberal framework is used “to mask the actual
111
character of power and to conceal domination.”
3. Paternalistic Dominance
Foucault’s insight that power operates through discourses that define and
legitimate its operation is also well demonstrated by the central role of
paternalistic dominance in perpetuating patriarchal hegemony. Paternalistic
dominance is a subset of patriarchal relations in which the relationship of
dominance “is mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights.” Women
112
“exchange submission for protection and unpaid labor for maintenance.”
Dominance is disguised as benevolence, and sexism—the ideology of male
supremacy and superiority over women—serves as the “factual” basis that
explains to women why they need this form of paternalism while
simultaneously allowing men to convince themselves that they are only acting
113
in everyone’s, especially women’s, best interests.
As Radford Ruether
poignantly observes, women trade “a diminished humanity for dependent
114
forms of security.”
Because women’s subordination is maintained primarily
through paternalistic dominance within the structure of the family, which is
traditionally understood as a haven of loving relations, it lends particular
credibility to the claim that benevolent domination obscures the political
implications of women’s subordination.

108.
109.

See e.g., Leslie C. Allen, The Old Testament in Romans I-VIII, 3 VOX EVANGELICA 6, 6 (1964).
See e.g., MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, FAITHFUL AND FEARLESS: MOVING FEMINIST PROTEST
INSIDE THE CHURCH AND MILITARY 132–58 (1998).
110. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 74–75.
111. FRASER, supra note 7, at 26–27.
112. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 239–40.
113. Id. at 240–41.
114. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 173.
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The central role of paternalistic benevolence in perpetuating patriarchy is
essential to understanding the role of patriarchal religion in maintaining the
hegemony of patriarchy. Religious hierarchy—God over man, man over
woman—is crucially based on benevolence and love. Just as God’s relation to
both man and woman is one of benevolent hierarchy, so man’s relation to
woman, and in particular to his wife, is also one of benevolent hierarchy. While
the notion that women are weak and inferior is aimed at persuading them that it
is futile and dangerous to resist the hierarchy, the notion that the hierarchy is
based on love and ordained by God is aimed at persuading women that it is
sinful, immoral, and ungrateful to resist it. Thus, religion is relied on as both the
foundational justification for women’s subordination to men and as a “daily
115
aid” in securing this subordination.
In sum, the hegemony of patriarchy in
religion is maintained by the existence of a clear gender hierarchy, immune from
change and presented as benevolent and ordained by God. The hegemony of
patriarchy maintains a monopoly on power and knowledge by prohibiting
women, on account of their sex, from knowing what they know through their
own experience and teaching them to live their lives according to the knowledge
produced by the male elite. What makes this structure seem natural and
inevitable to so many women is not only its eternality, but also its pervasiveness,
mutatis mutandis, across disciplines and cultures.
C. Religion as a Major Tool in the Oppression of Women—The Views of Early
American Feminists
In her book The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, Gerda Lerner maintains
that for more than a thousand years women’s major intellectual enterprise was
to re-conceptualize religion in such a way that would give them an equal and
central role and counteract the pervasive patriarchal assumptions of their
116
inferiority and incompleteness as human beings.
According to Lerner,
“[w]omen’s striving for emancipation was acted out in the arena of religion long
117
before women could conceive of political solutions for their situation.” Lerner
identifies both “the misogynist explanatory system that dominated church
doctrine and shaped ideas of gender in society,” and the belief “in the Godgiven inferiority of women and their subordinate position” as the major causes
for women’s subservience and their difficulties in fighting their oppression to
118
create a feminist consciousness.
All women, whether religious or not, were
adversely affected by the core Biblical texts which were used time and again by
119
patriarchal authorities to justify women’s subordination. The prohibitions on
women’s thinking, teaching, and speaking in public were all based on biblical
authority and “[t]hese biblical core texts sat like huge boulders across the paths
120
women had to travel in order to define themselves as equals of men.”

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at,170.
GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS 10–11 (1993).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 138.
Id.
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1. The Grimke Sisters
Sara and Angelina Grimke, two of the most important abolitionist
feminists, recognized the inseparability and interrelation between equality at the
state level and equality within religion as early as the middle of the nineteenth
century. Given their special life circumstances and the period in which they
lived, perhaps it is not surprising that the Grimke sisters saw so clearly almost
two centuries ago what is hidden from the eyes of so many today. The sisters
were born into a southern slave holding family but left the South due to their
deep objections to slavery and their own family’s commitment to the practice in
121
particular and settled in the north. Their antislavery activism and the negative
reactions they received as women trying to speak publicly in front of northern
audiences led them to develop the analogy between the immoral prejudices of
122
racism and sexism.
Catharine Beecher, an avid believer in the heavenly
ordained superiority of man, and in separate spheres for men and women, who
was a strong objector to the Grimke’s public speaking, received a letter from
Angelina explaining that “[t]he investigation of the rights of the slave has led me
123
to a better understanding of my own.”
In another letter, Angelina suggests
124
“the rights of the slave [and] woman blend like the colors of the rainbow.”
According to Angelina, all human beings have rights because they are moral
beings, and although these rights can be wrested from the slave, his entitlement
to them will not change. Similarly, the “mere circumstance of sex” does not give
man higher rights than those of woman because this physical circumstance is
125
secondary to the moral nature of both men and women.
The Grimke’s public speaking on abolition brought to the forefront the
parallel issue of women’s rights and elicited strong condemnation of the sisters
from ministers of the church. Strong pressure was subsequently applied to the
sisters by various leaders of the abolitionist movement to stop addressing the
126
issue of women’s rights altogether.
In response to this pressure, the sisters
expressed their conviction that they could not effectively fight for abolition
without defending their own right to speak their minds in public. They asserted
that the attack on them was part of a deep-laid scheme of the clergy to silence
127
women and prevent them from exercising their right to conscience.
“What
then can woman do for the slave, when she is herself under the feet of man
128
[and] shamed into silence,” or alternatively, what power can woman have if
she is not even allowed to speak? According to the sisters, the struggles for the
abolition of slavery and for women’s rights were two inseparable parts of the
same whole, and the church government, which stood in the way of reform on

121.

DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM
83 (1998).
Id. at 83–84.
THE PUBLIC YEARS, supra note 1, at 194.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 281–93.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.

AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW
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both issues, would have to come down in order for the reform to take place.
Matilda Joslyn Gage, a contemporary of the Grimkes and an avowed feminist in
her own right, pointed to the clergy attacks on the Grimke sisters and the timid
response of the anti-slavery leadership as the cause of the sisters’ withdrawal
130
from public advocacy for the abolitionist movement. Importantly, the power
utilized by the church to silence the Grimke sisters and to perpetuate the
hegemony of white patriarchy was neither the power of law nor that of the
sovereign. It was strictly the private power of religious and cultural prejudice in
a society in which women were, in the words of Elizabeth Cady Stanton “slaves
131
of custom, creed and sex” that silenced the Grimke sisters and put an end to
their struggle for equality and freedom.
The race–sex analogy, coupled with their deep religious convictions and
the openly and pervasively sexist society in which they lived allowed the
Grimke sisters to see clearly that equality for women can simply not be achieved
until it is achieved not only at the state level but also in custom and creed.
Angelina writes:
Now, I believe it is woman’s right to have a voice in all the laws and regulations
by which she is to be governed, whether in Church or State; and that the present
arrangements of society, on these points, are a violation of human rights, a rank
usurpation of power, a violent seizure and confiscation of what is sacredly and
inalienably hers—thus inflicting upon woman outrageous wrongs, working
mischief incalculable in the social circle, and in its influence on the world
132
producing only evil, and that continually.

According to Grimke, women have a right to complete equality in both
church and state because each one exercises power over women and women’s
lack of voice evidences their lack of power. Equality in society demands
equality of power in both church and state and cannot be ensured by having one
without having the other. Thus, when the state defends patriarchal religion and
culture and denies women the right to equality within them, such denial is not
merely a neutral exercise aimed at ensuring religious and cultural freedom but a
usurpation of power and a violation of human rights.
2. Elizabeth Cady Stanton
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a contemporary of the Grimke sisters who is best
known for her leadership role in organizing the Seneca Falls women’s rights
convention in 1848 and in the struggle for women’s suffrage, was one of the
133
fiercest critics of the role of religion in the oppression of women.
Her
publication of a feminist interpretation of the bible called The Woman’s Bible led
to her condemnation by the National American Woman Suffrage Association,
and due to the uncompromising nature of her views, she was unable to obtain
129.
130.
131.

Id.
MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE 447 (1893).
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS,
SPEECHES 81 (Ellen Carol Dubois ed., 1981) [hereinafter READER].
132. THE PUBLIC YEARS, supra note 1, at 197 (emphasis added).
133. READER, supra note 131, at 182–93.
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the financial backing necessary for the publication of her speeches and
134
writings.
Stanton believed that religion was the most effective tool for the
subordination of women, for “she never could have been held the pliant tool she
is to day but for the subjugation of her religious nature to the idea that in
whatever condition she found herself as man’s subject, that condition was
135
ordained by Heaven . . . .” The major problem was women’s internalization of
their own subordinate position. “[A]ll the religions on the face of the earth
degrade her, and so long as woman accepts the position that they assign her, her
136
emancipation is impossible.”
After describing her own emancipation from
“false theology,” which was facilitated by her discussions with William
Garrison, Stanton asks, “[i]s the bondage of the priest-ridden less galling than
that of the slave, because we do not see the chains, the indelible scars, the
festering wounds, the deep degradation of all the powers of the God-like
137
mind?” Thus, as early as the mid-nineteenth century feminists such as Stanton
have had an acute understanding of the way hegemony ensures domination by
constituting “the terrains of meaning and feeling that are central to the securing
of consent and/or the incitement to rebellion” thereby rendering the use of force
138
and coercion to secure cooperation largely unnecessary.
With the growing influence of organized religion in the women’s
movement and in American politics in general in the 1880’s and the 1890’s,
Stanton’s lifelong interest in the relationship between religion (especially
139
Christianity) and the idea of women’s inferiority grew stronger.
Consequently, she published The Woman’s Bible in which she and other feminist
writers gave their own feminist interpretations of biblical passages that were
140
traditionally used to justify the subordination of women. In the introduction
to The Woman’s Bible, Stanton explained the centrality of religion to the
oppression of women and responded to the criticisms aimed at her project.
First, she pointed to the Bible as the source of women’s divinely ordained
inferiority and described how this idea was used by both the church and the
state to justify woman’s subservience to man:
The Canon and the civil law; church and state; priests and legislators; all
political parties and religious denominations have alike taught that woman was
made after man, of man, and for man, an inferior being, subject to man. Creeds,
codes, Scriptures and statutes, are all based on this idea. The fashions, forms,
ceremonies and customs of society, church ordinances and discipline all grow
141
out of this idea . . . .

134. Id.
135. Id. at 136.
136. Id. at 232.
137. Id. at 80. William Lloyd Garrison was a prominent abolitionist and social reformer and one
of the founders of the American Anti-Slavery Society.
138. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23.
139. Id. at 228.
140. Id.
141. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN’S BIBLE, PART ONE (1895), in READER, supra note
131, at 229.
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Next, Stanton turned to answer the criticisms leveled against her.
Interestingly, the two major arguments raised against her project are the same
arguments still raised today against those who suggest challenging patriarchal
religion. These enduring, albeit contradictory, arguments offer on the one hand,
that it is audacious and impolitic to challenge religion (presumably because it is
a challenge to people’s deeply held beliefs), and on the other hand that it is a
useless waste of energy to criticize something as obsolete and inconsequential as
142
religion.
To the charge of audacity and lack of political prudence Stanton
queried:
Why is it more ridiculous for women to protest against her [sic] present status in
the Old and New Testament, in the ordinances and discipline of the church,
than in the statutes and constitution of the state? . . . Women have compelled
their legislators in every state in this Union to so modify their statutes for
women that the old common law is now almost a dead letter. Why not compel
143
Bishops and Revising Committees to modify their creeds and dogmas?

She insists that women’s situation cannot be changed without arousing
religious opposition and that “an entire revolution in all existing institutions is
inevitable” if such a “far-reaching and momentous” reform as changing
144
woman’s position from a subordinate to an equal is to be achieved.
Importantly, Stanton reminds us that “all reforms are interdependent” and that
145
those who compromise cannot achieve reform. With regard to the claim that
the Bible is inconsequential and that most intelligent women have no reverence
for it, Stanton’s reply is as accurate and as forceful today as it was over a
hundred years ago:.
So long as tens of thousands of Bibles are printed every year, and circulated over
the whole habitable world, and the masses in all English-speaking nations
revere it as the word of God, it is vain to belittle its influence. The sentimental
feelings we all have for those things we were educated to believe sacred, do not
146
readily yield to pure reason . . . .

Thus, in the past patriarchal religion was the primary force shaping culture
and the state yet today religion and the state have been largely separated and
culture has expanded beyond the realm of religion. But, the assumption that by
simply ignoring patriarchal religion and its misogynistic teachings it is possible
to negate their current influence remains as futile as the assumption that by
simply ignoring power we negate it existence:
[M]any of us are under the impression that all we have to do is not enter a
church, refuse to practice the sacraments, and never read the sacred texts in
order to be free from the influence of religion in our lives . . . . This does not
solve the problem of how significant is the influence of religion upon culture.
Thus, we are all imbued with the many Greek, Latin, Asian, Jewish and

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 231–32.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 232–33.
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Christian traditions, at least, particularly through the art, philosophy and myths
we live by, exchange, and perpetuate, often without our realizing. Simply
negating what already exists cannot make the passage from one era to the
147
next.

The consequences of women’s inequality within religion and culture are far
reaching. As Lerner argues, “the structuring of society in such a way that
women were for millennia excluded from the creation of the cultural product
has more decisively disadvantaged women in their economic and political rights
148
than any other factor.” Because hegemonic culture along with the relations of
149
dominance and subordination become an inseparable part of the self, the
hegemonic culture “constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a
sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult
150
for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.” Today
liberal states, such as the United States, do not outright exclude women from
shaping culture. Nevertheless, they actively and no less successfully, assist in
perpetuating the hegemony of patriarchy by protecting the right of powerful
patriarchal religions and other patriarchal communities to exclude women from
positions of power. The result is that women have no voice in the shaping of the
internal cultures of many communities within the state and consequently have
much less than an equal say in the shaping of the overall culture of the state. By
tolerating discrimination and protecting the religious, cultural, and associational
rights of the leaders of patriarchal religious and cultural groups, and by refusing
to assist dissenters within those groups to shape the group’s cultural product,
the state legitimates the continued existence of overt patriarchy and protects
patriarchy’s power base from any external and even internal challenge.
IV. PATRIARCHY, RELIGION AND THE LAW
A. Religious Law as the Law Governing the Rights of Early American Women
The United States Constitution is silent on issues of women and family,
leaving the power to regulate women’s status and the family relationship to the
151
states through the Tenth Amendment.
All states have chosen to perpetuate
152
the English common law doctrine of coverture,
thereby incorporating
essentially a highly discriminatory religious view of women into their laws.
This transformation from religious edict to common law tradition and then to
civil law is particularly interesting for two reasons: first, because it demonstrates

147. TOVA HARTMAN HALBERTAL, APPROPRIATELY SUBVERSIVE, MODERN MOTHERS IN
TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS 2 (2002) (quoting LUCE IRIGARAY, JE, TU, NOUS: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF
DIFFERENCE 23 (1993)).
148. LERNER, supra note 116, at 272.
149. Williams, supra note 31, at 596–97.
150. Id.
151. BARBARA ELLEN BABCOCK ET. AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE
AND THEORY 16 (2nd ed. 1996).
152. Id. at 16–17.
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the way patriarchal religion has operated as the fundamental force behind the
creation of the hegemony of patriarchy in society; second, because it reveals the
way in which the decrease in the power and centrality of religion and the
increase in the power of non-religious culture have transformed patriarchal
religious edicts into patriarchal non-religious traditions, which later could be
legitimately incorporated into civil law without offending the mandate of
separation between religion and the state.
In her epic book, Women, Church and State, Matilda Joslin Gage, a
nineteenth century American feminist, described in detail how the ecclesiastical
or canon law with regard to marriage and the status of women became
incorporated into English common law and was later adopted into the civil law
153
of the States of the Union.
She argued that following the incorporation of
canon law into the common law, “the complete inferiority and subordination of
154
woman ha[d] been as fully maintained by the State as by the Church.”
For
example, Gage argued that the canon law that forbids women to “presume to
teach a man in a public assembly” became the basis for the common law rule
155
which denied women admittance to the bar, the pulpit or medicine.
This
contention is fully substantiated by Bradwell v. Illinois in which the Supreme
Court explained that Myra Bradwell’s attempt to obtain a license to practice law
156
contradicted both the common law of coverture and the law of the creator.
Furthermore, canon law that barred a wife from leaving her husband without
his consent also prohibited anyone from harboring or sheltering her under
penalty of law. Gage recounted a court case in New York that awarded a
husband who sued those who sheltered his wife after she left him ten thousand
157
dollars on the basis of this canon turned common law. Thus, while American
men were guaranteed the First Amendment protections of free exercise and non
establishment of religion, American women’s lives were subjected entirely to
patriarchal religious law transformed into patriarchal common law and later
incorporated into civil law which was buttressed by the coercive powers of the
state. A law which, in Stanton’s words turned American women into a legal
158
nonentity.
According to the rules of coverture, women lost their legal capacities,
which were transferred to their husband and master upon marriage. The
woman’s rights to her property and her earnings were transferred to her

153. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145–53. See also HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, Chapter 5
(1861), available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/maine/anclaw/chap05.
(“The Scandinavian laws, harsh till lately to all females, are still remarkable for their severity to
wives. And scarcely less stringent in the proprietary incapacities it imposes is the English Common
Law, which borrows far the greatest number of its fundamental principles from the jurisprudence of
the Canonists.”).
154. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145.
155. Id. at 146.
156. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
157. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 149.
158. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York on Women’s Rights, February 14,
1854, in READER, supra note 131, at 44, 48.
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husband, and she was no longer able to contract or file suit in her own name.
The wife became subordinate to her husband and was subject to his power to
160
161
chastise her or even to rape her with impunity.
The justification for the
woman’s complete loss of status and individual rights following her marriage
was based on her consent to the marriage and on the concept of the union
formed between husband and wife upon marriage. As Nancy Cott explains,
“[b]oth the emphasis on consent and the principle of union seamlessly adapted
162
Christian doctrine to Anglo-American law.”
The rules of coverture were
directly applicable only to married women; however, because in the prevailing
ideology of the time all women were either on their way to marriage, married,
or widowed, these rules defined not only women’s relationship to the man they
163
married, but also their place in the polity in general. For example in Bradwell,
the Supreme Court explained that although it is true that many women are
unmarried and are therefore not affected by the duties and incapacities which
the state imposes on married women, unmarried women are “exceptions to the
164
general rule” and the rules of civil society cannot be based on such exceptions.
Consequently, the same rules excluding married women from the bar applied to
unmarried women as well.
The same Founders who guaranteed to all men free exercise and non
establishment of religion as constitutional rights simultaneously incorporated
religious notions of women’s subordination into the American civil law and
165
thereby ensured the continued subordination of women in the new Union. It
is likely that neither the Founders nor most other Americans of that period ever
felt the contradiction or questioned the propriety of incorporating these
religiously-based discriminatory notions into the American civil law. It might
even be argued along the lines of contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine,
that the states had a good secular reason to incorporate the religiously-based
English common law with regard to women’s marriage rights namely because it
was part of the common law of England that was incorporated en masse as the
166
civil law of the various states. Nevertheless, it is exactly this sort of allegedly
innocuous incorporation of patriarchal religion and culture into the civil law
167
that is still prevalent today, and best explains why exempting the patriarchal
religious and cultural communities from the need to abide by norms of equality

159. Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love:” Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE. L.J. 2117,
2122–23 (1996).
160. Id.
161. See e.g. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
162. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11(2000).
163. Id.
164. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
165. According to Babcock, “Sixteen of the subscribers to the first American edition of
Blackstone’s commentaries were signatories of the Declaration of Independence, six were delegates
to the Constitutional Convention.” BABCOCK ET. AL., supra note 151, at 17.
166. See, e.g., Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), discussed infra note 183.
167. See, e.g., Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 306–12 (1984).
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serves to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy and flies in the face of ensuring
women’s right to equality and freedom in the liberal state.
B. Religious Freedom, Freedom of Association and the Right to Culture as
Status-Enforcing Mechanisms
Similar to any other hegemony, the hegemony of patriarchy has
throughout history been challenged, contested, and transformed accordingly.
Lerner stresses that throughout history, patriarchy appears in various forms and
modes and its structure and function shift and change as it adapts to female
168
pressure and demands.
A common example is the law of coverture, which
transformed religious law into common law and then into civil law with each
transformation intended to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy in the most
appropriate means for the particular day and age.
In several historical studies, Reva Seigel demonstrates how “status
169
regimes” evolve over time in order to preserve social stratification.
Group
inequalities that are socially pervasive and persistent (articulated across social
domains and over time) are typically referred to as a condition of social
170
stratification. Social stratification is formed through the social structure—such
as institutions (slavery or marriage) and practices, and through social
171
meaning—such as stories and reasons. According to Siegel, what is perhaps
most visible in a historical perspective is the heterogeneity of institutions,
practices, stories, and reasons that sustain the unequal social position of
different groups over time. The elements of social structure and social meaning
that sustain stratification vary by group and within groups, and they evolve
172
over time as their legitimacy is contested. Struggles over group inequality that
transform the rules and reasons by which social stratification is enforced and
173
justified are termed by Siegel “preservation through transformation.”
Thus,
her account of social stratification and how it is created, maintained, contested,
and transformed is very similar to the traditional concept of hegemony used in
this article to describe the process of social and cultural domination and
subordination.
But, her account lacks the crucial explanation of the manner in which the
hegemonic order (or what Siegel would term the “status regime”) becomes part
174
of the self, even for the subordinated group.
Her account is illuminating

168. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 239.
169. See e.g. Reva Siegel “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175–79
for a detailed explanation of status regimes and their evolvement over time.
170. Reva B. Seigel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 99, 105 (Robert C. Post et. al.) (2001) [hereinafter Discrimination in the Eyes
of the Law].
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 143.
174. For discussion of the patriarchal construction of gender in western societies, see Gender
Construction, supra note 85.
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however in how she shows historically that law can be used covertly as a statusenforcing mechanism (that is, to perpetuate hegemony) without appearing to do
so. It is plausible to argue that precisely because hegemony constitutes the self,
it is so hard for us to identify and resist the law when it is used to perpetuate
hegemony. At the same time, it is important for us to question the assertion that
the law is neutral and to continuously examine the ways in which allegedly
neutral laws can serve to perpetuate domination and subordination.
Seigel shows how in various instances—such as racial segregation of public
accommodation, violence against women, and married women’s property—
prior regimes of social stratification and overt discrimination that were
previously sanctioned by the state were abolished after it became politically
incorrect to maintain them and how in their place, a new discourse of privacy
was used to maintain, at least to some degree, the previous discrimination on
175
allegedly benign grounds. Seigel argues that privacy has replaced open racism
176
and sexism as a status-enforcing mechanism.
A similar development can be
traced with respect to the use of patriarchal culture and religion as statusenforcing mechanisms used to maintain women’s subordinated position in
society and perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy.
After centuries in which the state and church openly combined their forces
to subjugate women and maintain male dominance through a combination of
civil and canon laws, the unholy pact between church and state was allegedly
severed, but the civil law concerning women remained unchanged, its
177
fundamental principles still based on discriminatory canon law. At the same
time that America prided itself on its “wall of separation” between religion and
the state, common law principles derived solely from canon law were used to
178
deny women all their rights through the institution of coverture.
After long
struggles, women succeeded in eliminating the legal institution of coverture, but
as Seigel points out in her studies, many of the notions underlying this
institution have remained and women’s subordination is maintained through
179
the use of new juridical forms such as the invocation of privacy.
Similarly,
when it became improper to justify women’s inequality at the state level on
grounds of Godly authority, formal equality at the state level was enacted
contemporaneously while women’s subordination within patriarchal religion
was maintained by invoking privacy, religious freedom, and freedom of
association. In addition, the regulation of sex and sexuality, including issues
such as abortion which have a crucial impact on women, continued to be largely
determined by patriarchal religious morality, albeit disguised as non-religious

175. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1116–29 (1997)
[hereinafter Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects].
176. Id.
177. See generally JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130.
178. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145–53.
179. Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 175, at 1118. “By the turn of the century,
courts seeking to justify wives’ continuing legal disabilities described marriage as an emotional
relationship subsisting in a private realm ‘beyond’ the reach of law–reasoning about the relationship
in these terms would have startled Blackstone.”
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Today, the state continuously refuses to intervene in patriarchal
tradition.
religion and culture on behalf of women, leaving them the impossible task of
achieving equality from a position of deep inferiority. Worse still, as will be
discussed below, even though equality is the professed norm in the United
States and separation between religion and the state is allegedly maintained, the
state still continues its support for patriarchal religion and culture by enforcing
their patriarchal morality and financing patriarchal religion through voucher
181
programs, charitable choice, and tax cuts.
C. How Do Patriarchal Religion and Culture Affect the Law Today?
Even today, through a use of their political power, patriarchal religions and
cultures that discriminate against women and in which women have little voice,
shape the law and through it the rights of all women. While the constitutional
separation between church and state may prevent an overt state-wide
institutionalization of religion, it is powerless to prevent the insertion of
patriarchal religion into politics, which adversely impacts the rights of all
women. Contemporary struggles that may have important ramifications
affecting the life of every American woman are being waged by feminists
against an increasingly politically powerful Christian Right over matters such as
182
abortion, contraception and sex education.
One pertinent example concerning abortion is Harris v. Mcrae, in which a
challenge was made to the Hyde amendment which prohibits federal funding of
abortions for Medicaid recipients except when the continuation of the
183
pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life. The plaintiffs in Mcrae argued
that the Hyde amendment was a violation of the Establishment clause because it
codified the teachings of the Roman Catholic church with regard to abortions.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the fact that the
law happens to coincide with the teachings of a certain religion does not lead to
a violation of the Establishment clause as long as there is a legitimate secular
184
purpose for the law.
Beyond the court’s intentional failure to take notice of the connection
between the law and Roman Catholic teachings, the secular purpose that the
Court found is particularly instructive. According to the Court, denying federal
funding for abortions is not an establishment of religion because “[t]he Hyde

180. See, e.g., JANET JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN 19–44 (2003) (discussing Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186 (1986) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); see also discussion of
Harris v. Mcrea, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) in section C below.
181. See Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and
Women’s Equality, 10 WILL. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 459 (2004) [hereinafter The Free Exercise of
Discrimination].
182. See, e.g., CRISTINA PAGE, HOW THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT SAVED AMERICA: FREEDOM,
POLITICS AND THE WAR ON SEX (2006); Patricia Donovan, The Adolescent Family Life Act and the
Promotion of Religious Doctrine, Vol. 16, No. 5 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 222 (Sep.–Oct., 1984);
Amy Nunn et. al., “Contraceptive Emergency: Catholic Hospitals Overwhelmingly Refuse to
Provide EC,” 24 Conscience 38 (2003).
183. Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
184. Id. at 319.
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amendment . . . is as much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards
185
abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion.” The
Court might very well be right. Patriarchal values are prevalent in both culture
and religion, and consequently in law.
Although it is often reiterated that the impetus for state legislation enacted
in the mid-nineteenth century banning abortion originated in the medical
profession, it is also true that the physician’s campaign was largely based on the
then-controlling societal perception about women’s godly-ordained roles and
duties and was couched in religious terms that directly appealed to religious
prejudices regarding women. In her detailed historical analysis of anti-abortion
legislation in the United States, Siegel demonstrates how doctors have used
religious understandings of women’s roles to advance their claim that the
community has the right and the duty to control procreation through the
186
medical profession, and how they used the women’s movement’s support for
abortion to generate support for their own anti-abortion campaign by
187
associating the right to abortion with the attack on established gender roles.
As Siegel argues, nineteenth century laws banning abortions were explicitly
based on the discriminatory view that women are destined solely for the home
188
and for the rearing of children, and should be understood in that context. In
the present, critics of the recent Gonzales v. Carhart decision could not fail to
notice that the five Supreme Court justices who voted to uphold the ban on
partial birth abortion and thus reverse the seven-year-old Stenberg v. Carhart
189
decision were all Catholics. These critics could not help but wonder how this
fact could be reconciled with the constitutional separation between church and
state. The critics’ critics answered in return that the allegation that the five
justices decided the case on the basis of their religious beliefs could not be
substantiated because religion was not mentioned once throughout the
190
decision.
It is probably impossible to find clear evidence supporting either
side of this unfinished debate. Nevertheless, it is becoming clearer than ever in
recent years that the notion that women’s rights are protected by the
constitutional separation of church and state from the reach of patriarchal
191
religious ideas is patently wrong.
Thus, the hegemony of patriarchy is maintained by translating patriarchal
religious edicts and patriarchal cultural assumptions into patriarchal law. In a

185. Id.
186. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 296–97 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoning from the Body].
187. Id. at 314.
188. Id. at 356.
189. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000); Robert Barnes, Did Justices’ Catholicism Play Part in Abortion Ruling?, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.
30 2007, at A13.
190. Barnes, supra note 189, at A13.
191. On the various facets of the relationship between religion and the state and its effects on
women’s rights, see Gila Stopler, The Liberal Bind: The Conflict Between Women’s Rights and Patriarchal
Religion in the Liberal State, 31 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 191 (2005).
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society such as the United States, in which separation between religion and the
state is allegedly maintained, religiously-based patriarchal edicts are buttressed
by non-religious patriarchal traditions in order to legalize patriarchal laws. In
countries that do not mandate separation between church and state, patriarchal
192
law can rest directly on religious grounds.
But, one could argue that this is
merely a semantic difference. The fusion so clearly apparent in Mcrae between
patriarchal religious values, patriarchal traditional values, and patriarchal laws
demonstrates the central argument of this article, namely, that the hegemony of
patriarchy is maintained through the creation of patriarchal values within
patriarchal religions and cultures which are then incorporated into patriarchal
law. Because power operates through discourses that legitimate its operation
and conceal domination, it is exactly the hegemonic nature of patriarchy which
193
keeps us oblivious to its pervasive presence.
As a result, the fundamental
problem with Mcrae, namely that it maintains the domination of women by
usurping their power to control their bodies, cannot even be discussed in terms
of domination and subordination because in a patriarchal world abortion is not
194
a matter of women’s equality. At the same time, the underlying cause of the
problem is that the patriarchal religious and cultural assumptions that are the
basis for the law cannot be challenged because they are protected by religious
liberty, by the right to culture and by freedom of association. This is how the
hegemony of patriarchy is maintained.
D. Toleration and Equality
One of the concepts that has been most distorted due to liberalism’s lack of
a proper understanding of power is toleration, which is regarded by many as
195
the fundamental tenet of liberalism.
Because calls for tolerance are made
without taking into account the power relations between those who demand
toleration and those who suffer the consequences thereof, the result is that most
often toleration is itself used as a status enforcing-mechanism. This is
particularly true with regard to women, who are a-priori excluded from most
accounts of toleration. Thus, while both discourse and practice are replete with
demands and grants of toleration for those that discriminate against women for
reasons of culture and religion, women’s demands for equality and the right to
conscience within their religion and culture are rejected as incompatible with the
principles of toleration. This is not surprising. Due to its origin as a remedy for
religious persecution of one group by another, toleration has mostly been
understood as applying between groups and not within them. Arguably, the
remedy for intra-group dissenters—the right to exit—is the exact opposite of
toleration because it protects the right of the dominant group members to be

192. See, e.g., The Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, 483–95 (2004) (discussing the case
of Israel and drawing comparisons to the situation in the United States).
193. See discussion of power and hegemony in section II.
194. Reasoning from the Body, supra note 186, at 347–80.
195. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, xxvi (2nd ed. 1996).
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intolerant while forcing the dissenters to exit the group and search elsewhere for
196
equality and for their right to conscience.
This conflict between toleration and women’s rights is not a light matter. If
power operates through discourse and if toleration is one of the most, if not the
most, powerful concepts of liberalism, then the discursive opposition between
women’s equality and toleration places anyone who tries to argue for women’s
equality within culture and religion at a serious disadvantage. Nonetheless, a
proper understanding of toleration would entail the exact opposite result.
Toleration as properly understood can only be invoked to restrain the use of
arbitrary and prejudiced power against powerless “others.” When it is used to
enforce and perpetuate arbitrary and prejudiced power, toleration is being
misused. Thus, toleration properly understood would entail respect for
women’s right to equality and to conscience within their religion and culture
197
both from members of their communities and from society at large.
All
invocations of toleration as justification for the continued subordination of
women are in conflict with the true meaning and purpose of toleration and
serve as a status-enforcing mechanism that perpetuates the hegemony of
patriarchy.
Two critiques of toleration are pertinent for understanding the way in
which the current concept of toleration can obstruct women’s rights. First,
toleration is used to sustain social structures of inequality, and second, the focus
on toleration leads to the condemnation of the struggle against injustice rather
198
than the condemnation of injustice itself.
Toleration as it is currently
understood reinforces the status quo by calling for an almost indiscriminate
acceptance of existing hierarchies, practices, and customs, regardless of any
adverse consequences. The anti-judgmental character of tolerance makes people
reluctant to take sides and to distinguish those who are being wronged from
199
those inflicting the wrong.
Consequently, injustice is obscured and even
denied. This is inimical to women’s rights because in most groups that demand
and receive toleration, women are subordinated and the practices and customs
tolerated are aimed at keeping them in that position. Even worse, in a culture in
which the struggle against injustice rather than injustice itself is perceived as the
major threat to public order and to peaceful co-existence, women who try to
challenge the existing hierarchy are silenced and branded as intolerant
200
extremists.
If reserving judgment is a virtue then critiquing is a vice and
struggling to change that which is not perceived as wrong, while stirring up

196. For a related argument on the reliance on the right to exit as reinforcing conservative
tendencies, see Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and
Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 214 (2002).
197. See, e.g., Habermas’ position that there should be no tolerance for prejudice and
discrimination. Jurgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 I. CON 2, 3 (2003).
198. JAKOBSEN & PELLEGEINI, supra note 180, at 58.
199. Id. at 59.
200. E.g., on the reaction of the Catholic Church to attempts by women activists to challenge
existing discriminatory norms, see MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, FAITHFUL AND FEARLESS MOVING
FEMINIST PROTEST INSIDE THE CHURCH AND MILITARY 134–48 (1998).
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conflict and strife, is especially problematic. Thus, toleration becomes a statusenforcing mechanism that perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy.
Nevertheless, if, as Ronald Dworkin famously argues, equality is the
ultimate value of any plausible political theory, then it must come before
201
toleration, and not vice versa.
As Habermas posits, the elimination of
prejudice must precede any talk of toleration, and though we must tolerate
people who think differently or have different beliefs from our own, prejudices
202
on the basis of religion, ethnicity, race, or sex must not be tolerated.
The
appropriate solution to prejudice is combating discrimination rather than calling
for “more tolerance,” and the classification of particular beliefs as prejudices
should be done “in light of the principle of equal treatment of all citizens,
203
especially given the notion of ‘full membership’ by everybody.”
This strict
intolerance of prejudice, if applied to private actors such as religious and
cultural communities, has the potential to revolutionize the status of women in
society. However, intolerance to prejudice should be accompanied by an
analysis of power that will allow us to decide what private actors should be
targeted. While eliminating prejudice on all levels is certainly desirable,
enforcing non-discrimination obligations on individuals in their intimate
204
relations for example would seem decidedly undesirable.
An analysis of
power would enable us to identify and dismantle the structures of power that
create and maintain male dominance and female subordination.
E. A Power Based Analysis of Toleration, Religious Liberty, and Cultural and
Associational Rights
There is no reason why a proper analysis of private power should not be
incorporated into our understanding of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural
and associational rights. The inclusion of considerations of inter-group and
intra-group power disparities in our understanding of the desired scope of
toleration and of religious, cultural, and associational rights would ensure
greater justice and equality not only for women, but for disempowered groups
in general. Although a proper analysis of power will rule out tolerating
religious and cultural practices that discriminate against women within
disfavored groups, it will simultaneously require tolerating other practices of
such groups, which do not involve discrimination or harm to others, and which
205
are of high religious or cultural value to people.
When toleration, religious

201. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).
202. Jurgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 I. CON 2, 3 (2003).
203. Id. Hence, a religious or cultural belief justifying the inferiority of classes of people (such as
women) and advocating the denial of their full and equal rights should be considered prejudice and
must not be tolerated. On the precedence of equality over culture, see generally BRIAN BARRY,
CULTURE AND EQUALITY (2001).
204. The right to intimate association and its scope was defined in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620–21 (1984). On the application of this right to religious associations, see The
Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, at 509–10.
205. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (in which employing the
suggested approach would lead to an opposite result than that of the court, allowing the use of
peyote for religious rituals).
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liberty, and cultural and associational rights are understood as means for
empowering individuals by enabling them to live their lives fully within the
cultural and religious contexts that constitute part of their selves, then a line can
be drawn between those practices that empower some at the expense of others,
and are therefore forbidden, and those practices that empower people without
disempowering others, and should therefore be protected.
Under a proper analysis of power, the traditional liberal solution to the
subordination of women within religious and cultural groups—tolerating the
206
discrimination but safeguarding the right of exit would be found lacking. The
liberal suggestion that the appropriate remedy for discrimination within the
group is for the oppressed to exit and establish their own group does not
provide any real solution for the oppressed, both because it is impracticable and
because exit only entrenches and legitimates the differences of power instead of
mitigating them. As for impracticability, it is questionable that the oppressed
have the practical and psychological ability or the desire, to leave the
207
community. The assumption that the disempowered can and should do what
208
the most powerful would find very hard to do is facetious.
As for the
entrenchment of power differentials, although it is true that exit, if practicable,
may enable oppressed religious women to establish their own egalitarian
religion, this will in no way change the social reality in which their egalitarian
religion will be largely powerless while the power to influence society and to
dictate social conditions, norms, and perceptions will remain in the hands of the
male leaders of the patriarchal religions. Furthermore, the reliance on the option
of exit protects patriarchal power from the need to answer calls for change
within the community and delegitimizes those who seek such change from
209
within.
Finally, when incorporating an analysis of power into our understanding of
toleration, religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights we should take
into account all forms of power and power disparities, including the power of
the state, the power of dominant religious and cultural groups, the power, or
lack thereof, of minority or non-dominant religious and cultural groups, and the
power, or lack thereof, of individuals within each group. This would necessitate
that the use of state power to ensure equality for women must be done across
the board, targeting dominant religious and cultural groups that discriminate

206. The right of exit is often suggested by liberals as a remedy for in-group discrimination. See
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT 93 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001); JEFF SPINNER-HALEV,
SURVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 53 (2000).
207. The Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, at 515–23.
208. It is quite surprising to observe that the same liberals who argue for the rights to freedom of
religion, freedom of thought, and freedom of association on the basis of the central importance of
religious and moral convictions and of enduring attachments and loyalties to individuals, and on
their inability to imagine themselves apart from these convictions, attachments and loyalties (e.g.,
Rawls), reverse this theoretical assumption when dealing with the disadvantaged members of the
community and assume that these members are quite capable of breaking with their convictions,
attachments and loyalties and exiting the community.
209. Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic
Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 214 (2002).
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against women as rigorously, and arguably even more rigorously, than nondominant ones. Restraining arbitrary and prejudiced power should start in
those places in which it is most influential. While it is true that many nondominant cultures and religions are as patriarchal, if not more so, than
dominant ones, the hegemony of patriarchy depends first and foremost on the
persistence of patriarchy in dominant religions and cultures, and not in their
non-dominant counterparts. Nevertheless, because the state should be equally
concerned with the fate of each subordinated individual, it must act to end
subordination in-non dominant groups as well.
V. CONCLUSION
As Angelina Grimke observed over a century and a half ago, not allowing
210
women an equal voice in religion and culture is “a rank usurpation of power.” In
a legal and political order which sees all political power as held by the sovereign
and denies the political and legal significance of the tremendous power inherent
in culture and religion, this usurpation of power is hardly noticed. Even worse,
in a legal and political order dominated by patriarchy, this usurpation of power
is sanctioned and protected by masking its insidious nature behind distorted
accounts of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights.
However, the foregoing inquiry into the way in which patriarchal religion and
culture have been tailored to create and maintain the hegemony of patriarchy
should make clear that until this “rank usurpation of power” is recognized and
remedied, and our understanding of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural
and associational rights is modified accordingly, equality for women will not be
achieved.

210.

THE PUBLIC YEARS supra note 1, at 197.

